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Abstract 
 
  France and Germany are two closely connected countries with two very different 
identities. Despite of these differences, they have been cooperating for many years and have 
represented a driving factor behind European integration. Both have had an interest in 
making the European Union a global actor with a more united foreign policy. Agreements 
between the two countries are not an axiom though, as the intervention in Libya has shown. 
We are going to use this disagreement as a setting for studying the differences between the 
two countries from constructivist and realist perspectives. This leads to an examination of the 
French identity as an important, global actor in opposition to the German perception of 
themselves as a civilian power, with a culture of restraint from military force. To test the 
relevance of these identities we are applying realist assumptions about national interest and 
rationality as well as constructivist ideas regarding their approaches to the Libyan crisis. We 
find that both French and German identities have played an integral part of their decisions, 
but also that their actions to a differing degree have been influenced by their national 
interest.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Peaceful demonstrations in several cities in Libya, inspired by the Tunisian and Egyptian 
revolts, were violently repressed by the regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, which in the 
spring of 2011 led to an armed rebellion, mainly in the east of the country around the city of 
Benghazi. The brutality of the military operations performed by troops loyal to Colonel 
Gaddafi against towns held by the rebels caused an outrage by the international community 
and made the reporting of the attacks against the civilian population major headlines around 
the world. In European countries, the United States, the African Union, the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference and the Arab League, the calls for an international intervention to 
protect civilians gathered strength and put pressure on the UN.  
The Security Council, referring to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, adopted Resolution 
1973 on March 17
th
 2011. In Resolution 1973, whose goal was to protect Libyan civilians, it 
was decided the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya and allowed willing countries to 
"take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of 
attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”. Resolution 1973 was submitted by France, Lebanon, 
and the United Kingdom. The preliminary negotiations had raised the opposition of Russia 
and China who finally abstained from voting after intense diplomatic activity of President 
Nicolas Sarkozy. It was passed by South Africa, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, the 
United States, France, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Five 
members abstained: Germany, Brazil, China, India, and Russia.   
  France was the most determined state for the Libya intervention. French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy made it his mission to organize a multilateral military intervention in Libya, 
and France has been the first country to recognize the legitimacy of the Benghazi-based 
rebels. On the other hand, Germany, France’s close ally, did not support the Libyan 
intervention. France and Germany had worked hand in hand since the end of the Second 
World War, and their relationship had been crucial for the stability of Europe and the 
evolution of the EU. Nevertheless, the “twin engines” of the European Union had radically 
differing points of view concerning the Libya intervention.  
  This raises the question: How can we explain the fact that the close allies that are 
France and Germany do have opposed views on the Libya intervention, and why did they act 
differently? 
  To answer this question, we will use constructivism in order to analyze the importance 
of identity and history on the differing actions of the two nations and realism to counterweight 
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constructivism with notions of power and economy. In a first part, we will analyze France’s 
motives to intervene in Libya through constructivism and realism. In a second part, we will 
explain why Germany did not want to participate to the intervention from constructivist and 
realist points of view. 
 
1.1 Purpose 
 
  We will use the intervention in Libya 2011 to conduct a comparative case study, as we 
seek to investigate the differences between France’s and Germany’s security policies. We are 
going to use constructivist theory to analyse their different identities and the implications they 
have on their actions. To counterweight this, we will also look into the power politics 
involved and try to look at their contrasting approaches from a realist perspective. Our 
objective is to determine which of these theories gives the best explanation of the conduct of 
the two nations and how they can complement each other. Is it the identities of France and 
Germany or their national interest which is the most important factor for their differing 
policies and is it equal results for both? 
During the uprising in Libya there were talks among the allied NATO forces about 
how to react and there was a vote in the UN on the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya 
which then resulted in a military intervention. France was amongst the nations who were 
supporting an intervention and Germany was amongst those who criticized it and chose to 
abstain from voting and did not participate in the operation. Our question is thus, was it 
identity or national interest that caused the close allies of France and Germany to act 
differently with regard to the Libyan crisis? 
 
 
1.2 Theory 
 
We have chosen to study the differing security policies of Germany and France from 
two contrasting perspectives, constructivism and realism. We want to study how the two 
theories can explain the actions of the two allies and if they are capable of finding various 
explanations to these differences. We think that both identity and self-interest would explain 
France’s will to intervene and Germany’s passivity regarding the intervention in Libya.  
Constructivism emphasizes the social aspect of human existence, the influence of the 
environment and interactions on the formation of our behavior. By applying constructivist 
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theory we mean to analyse how large a part identity and history has played in forging the 
differing policies and to how big an extent it was relevant in the Libya intervention. Our 
hypothesis is that France’s long interventionist history in Africa and Germany’s reluctance to 
use force can influence their security policies and attitudes towards the Libya intervention. 
We are going to use Hanns J. Maull’s concept of civilian power, by which he sees a German 
identity as an anti-militaristic nation who prefers multilateral cooperation and human rights 
over unilateral actions and self interest. Further we are also going to be criticising this concept 
from a realist point of view, utilising their more national interest influenced notions of power. 
We have chosen to use a realist perspective that, to some extent, is influenced by the 
work of Kenneth Waltz. Indeed, in Man, the State and War, he explains that the causes of war 
can be explained from three different levels of analysis: the individual, the state and the 
international level. We will analyze why France intervened in Libya from two levels of 
analysis: the individual and the state level.  We will also use Robert Gilpin’s theory, which 
asserts that a nation is not always trying to maximize its security but is also capable of 
pursuing other goals such as economic strength as long as it does not jeopardizes this security 
(Miskimmon 402). This realist approach to examine their actions will mean we will have to 
seek other explanations such as power and economy. The actions of France and Germany may 
to a larger extent be derived from economical and security reasons rather than from their 
identities.  From a realist perspective, they will probably be seen to act accordingly to a 
rational national interest instead of being influenced by a more deeply lying identity. We 
believe that France has a more direct national interest in Libya as they rely more on a steady 
supply of oil than Germany who, to a wider extent, uses other energy resources and therefore 
does not have as strong an incentive to participate in the intervention as France does. We 
believe that this creates a good foundation for a realist analysis  
     
1.3 Method 
 
     We are going to use a qualitative method where we are going to rely on second hand 
sources to make our analysis. As mentioned, we will include two different perspectives in our 
paper to compare the French and German security policies, thereby using a comparative 
method. We will use scientific papers and articles, as well as news articles and official 
speeches to build our conclusions on.  
Discussing Germany, we will use the book of Ruth Wittlinger, German National 
Identity in the Twenty-First Century: a Different Republic After All?, in which she describes 
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the changes in the German identity after the unification and writes about the development of 
German foreign policy. To get a constructivist point of view, we are using Maull’s paper 
Germany and the Use of Force: Still a Civilian Power?, where he discusses German identity 
from a role concept of normative, civilian power and the development of the German foreign 
policy. To counterbalance Maull’s ideas about civilian power and the normative value given 
to it we are going to apply the ideas of Regina Karp’s paper Germany: A ‘normal’ actor?, 
with its criticism of the normative concept and get another, more varied explanation of how 
Germany is wielding its power. Contrasting the discussion about identity we will also use 
Alister Miskimmon’s work: German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crises, making a rational 
cost/benefit calculation based on the German interests in Libya versus the cost of the 
intervention.  
     In order to analyze why France intervened in Libya from a constructivist point of 
view, we will analyze the French identity which is in large part shaped by Charles de Gaulle’s 
views on France, which he wrote in his War Memoirs, Mémoires de Guerre. We will also use 
official websites of the French government and of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
such as France Diplomatie and Vie Publique to understand how France perceive its role in the 
international system and thus which identity she has. We will also use an article written by 
Franck Petiteville, Quatre décennies de “coopération franco-africaine”: usage et usure d’un 
clientélisme, to analyze which role France has in Africa. In order to offset these constructivist 
arguments, we will use an article written by Jean-Robert Henry, Sarkozy, the Mediterranean 
and the Arab Spring in which he explains that Sarkozy had personal interests in intervening in 
Libya, which are due to his strong commitment in the French policy towards Mediterranean 
countries. Then, we will mostly use figures published by the French National Institute for 
Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) which describe the source of the crude oil imported 
by France in 2011. We will use these figures to show the importance of the Libyan oil for 
France’s security. 
 
 
2. France’s motives for an intervention in Libya through a constructivist perspective 
2.1 The homeland of Human Rights: an identity 
 
          On the eve of the French Revolution, the National Constituent Assembly adopted on 
August 26
th
, 1789, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. France is proud to 
have created one of the first republics and to have been one of the first countries to write such 
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a statement of Human Rights. This text has still a constitutional value: this heritage is at the 
heart of France’s national diplomatic ambitions: France advocates for the ratification of 
conventions protecting human rights at the global level (France.fr, 2009). Human rights are a 
priority of France’s foreign policy. France sees itself as a promoter of the Rechtsstat and an 
advocate of human rights, two key elements of democratic governance. In fact, the Ministry 
of Foreign and European Affairs speaks of "development assistance and democratic 
governance" as a single concept, categorizing the support of Human Rights as part of its 
policy on democratic governance
 
(France Diplomatie, 2009). 
To demonstrate its commitment to these values abroad, France emphasizes its 
participation "in the formulation of many of the doctrines and international instruments in the 
field of Human Rights"(France Diplomatie, 2009). On the diplomatic front, France inspired 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948; it remains active in the Council of 
Human Rights of the United Nations and supports humanitarian programs of UN agencies and 
non-governmental organizations. In addition, France is using its capable military capacity to 
participate in many operations of peacekeeping around the world in countries such as Chad, 
Ivory Coast, Lebanon, and Kosovo. While France argues that democracy and human rights 
have "historical significance" for France and its policy, it recognizes that human rights are 
universal (France Diplomatie, 2009). According to a publication of the Ministry of Foreign 
and European Affairs, the "promotion and protection of human rights and democratization 
process is an essential component of the foreign policy of France" (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2010). France is really attached to these two priorities because during the eighteenth 
century, it was France itself that had to establish a democratic government and assert the 
rights of its own citizens. The incorporation of these principles in its foreign policy allows 
France to share these values, which are at the heart of its national identity, with the rest of the 
international community. 
Charles de Gaulle is one of the most important and influential figures in the History of 
France and its foreign policy, and the Gaullist ideas continue to influence French politics 
today. Charles de Gaulle is known as a General, the "leader of the Free French" during the 
Second World War, Statesman and French President. Its policy is primarily associated with 
the concept of "greatness" of France. In 1954 he wrote in his War Memoirs, "I, instinctively 
feel that Providence [created the France] for completed successes or evil practices. [...] In 
short, in my opinion, France cannot be France without greatness"(De Gaulle, 1954). De 
Gaulle believed that France had a unique role in the world, and he has led a foreign policy that 
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would allow France to carry out this role. Charles de Gaulle clearly communicated the French 
independence and emphasized its influence on the international scene. 
According to constructivism, state behavior is shaped by beliefs, identities and social 
norms, which are formed through ideas and practices. States and national interests are the 
result of social identities
 
(Mingst 2010, p.84). Thus, from a constructivist point of view, 
France’s identity is shaped by its history and perception of itself as protector of Human 
Rights. During the Arab Spring, Human Rights have been violated in Libya. In regards to 
these violations, Sarkozy stated that these revolutions have generated great hope in the heart 
of all of those who share the values of democracy and human rights. According to President 
Sarkozy, the Arab people needed France’s help and support, and France had to do it because it 
is its duty, and thereby, France would assume its historic role as protector of Human Rights 
(Libération, 2011). By intervening in Libya, France did act in the name of the universal 
conscience which could not tolerate Gaddafi’s crimes. 
Resolution 1973 decided the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya and allowed 
willing countries to "take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 
1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”(Resolution 1973). Thus, Resolution 1973, which permitted the 
Libya intervention, aimed at protecting Libyan civilians, which is entirely consistent with the 
French identity.  
  
 
 2.2 Françafrique: the trace of a colonial heritage 
 
           For over fifty years, Franco-African relations have been characterized by an undeniable 
desire of power from the French side. France makes its official African policy an influence 
policy, conceived as an essential footboard to its audience in the world (Petiteville 1996, 
p.572). This data has been well summarized by the French Africanist Jean-François Bayart: « 
Paris has never stopped thinking its African policy as a simple instrument of its political 
power. From an Imperial dream in the late nineteenth century to a retreat in good order, from 
decolonization to conservation management cooperation, continuity was evident» (Bayart 
1992, p.141). This use of the African scene for the purpose of global influence, which is well 
reflected by the expressions «preserve» or «turf», is indeed one of the major features of the 
French specificity on the international scene. Charles de Gaulle acknowledged the importance 
of France’s power in Africa to prop up French power on the world stage (Charbonneau 2008, 
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p.279-295). According to de Gaulle, France is synonymous with grandeur, influence and 
power, for which colonies were paramount. The fact remains that the geopolitical obsession of 
maintaining French influence in Africa is characterized by its intangibility through time, to 
the point that it deeply structured the history of Franco-African relations and created an 
identity of connectedness that still influences the cooperation.  
Indeed, after the Second World War, de Gaulle outlined France’s desired relational 
goals in regard to its colonies. This would not only survive decolonization, but would remain 
intact through his presidential mandate under the fifth Republic. As noted by Albert Mabileau 
and Patrick Quantin, the African dimension of de Gaulle’s conception of politics puts “France 
as the subject of reflection and African countries as means to promote its goals” (Quantin and 
Mabileau 1980, p. 54). The authors add: "For its permanence and ambivalence, the Gaullist 
representation of Africa (...) conveyed the myths of the colonial consciousness beyond time” 
(Ibid., p. 61.) In fact, General de Gaulle's successors had little innovation to do concerning 
African policy. Despite the significant shifts in the international environment, the French 
policy towards Africa did not change, and was as a continuation of the rigid Gaullist 
conception French-African relations. 
The term “Françafrique” was used to describe this situation. It was used as a political 
symbol and as an ideology to authorize, among other things, projects favoring the 
development of African natural and human resources to the benefit of France. France doesn’t 
hesitate to use military force to protect this development. Indeed, no Western government has, 
since the 1960s, been engaged in Africa as much as France has and no other former European 
colonial power has maintained, in the post-colonial era, a relationship with Africa in the way 
France has. Since the 1960s, the French army intervened to nearly forty times on African soil 
(Fourt, 2010). This makes the Libya intervention a part of a long tradition of France as an 
intervener, which constitutes a part of the French identity as a powerful actor in Africa. 
Because of its colonial past, its long tradition of interventionism and its influence in 
Africa, France sees itself as being the country that has the most legitimacy to intervene in 
African countries. This identity is deeply rooted in French minds. Indeed, 70% of the French 
population saw the French participation in the Libya intervention as legitimate which is in 
stark opposition to how the majority of the Germans thought (Political Overview 2011, p.29). 
On the other hand, It would be wrong to represent the policy of French influence as a 
unilateral decision imposed by the former colonial power. While France is undoubtedly the 
western country that intervened the most in Africa, it does not systematically act according to 
its national interests. In some cases, France intervened following requests by African leaders, 
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although French national interests were not at stake, thus showing that the French identity as a 
leader and protector of Africa is still relevant. 
An example of this can be found in the case of Chad: African Heads of State called 
moderate, who were worried about Colonel Qaddafi’s intentions in Chad, have regularly 
relied on a French intervention in this country, and when they believed a withdrawal of 
France was imminent, they did not hesitate to pressure on the French government (Petiteville 
1996, p.577). The French identity as protector of the stability in Africa is shared by the 
communities of both Africa and France, which reinforces itself. Thus, the Libya intervention 
is seen as legitimate both from the French and the African point of view. 
 
3. France’s motives for an intervention in Libya from a realist point of view 
            
           According to realism, all military intervention justified on humanitarian grounds have 
been, are and will be driven by national interests, for the simple reason that states are not and 
should not be altruist because their main purpose is to defend the interests of their citizens and 
to ensure their own survival. Thus, the arguments advanced by the constructivists concerning 
the reasons why France intervened in Libya are greatly opposed to those of the realists. In 
Man, the State and War, a theoretical analysis, Kenneth N. Waltz uses three levels of analysis 
to explain the causes of war. This categorization gives three different sources of explanation: 
the individual, the state and the international system. In this second part, we will use two of 
these three levels to explain the reasons why France led the Libya intervention. We will begin 
with the individual level and define Sarkozy’s interests in intervening in Libya. Then we will 
analyze the French national interests that could be achieved by waging the Libya intervention. 
 
3.1 The Libya intervention or “Sarkozy’s War” 
 
           By focusing on the individual level, the personality, perceptions, choices and activities 
of individual decision makers and participants provide the explanation a state’s actions 
(Mingst 2010, p.68). According to classical realist Morgenthau, politics is governed by laws 
which are rooted in the nature of ‘Man’. With respect to the individual level of analysis, the 
central actor in France concerning the Libya intervention is then-President Nicolas Sarkozy. 
In fact, Sarkozy committed himself to the Libyan "adventure in a way that has rarely been 
seen by a western leader during a post-Cold War international crisis” (Bagehot, 2011). What 
are the reasons of this strong commitment? According to classical realists, who have a very 
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pessimistic view on human nature, individuals are power seeking, selfish and antagonistic 
(Mingst 2010, p.74). Indeed, Saint Augustine believed that men are egoistic and selfish, and 
that these characteristics were the causes of war. Thus, according to the realist view of men, 
Sarkozy’s motives to intervene in Libya are nothing but the fruit of his personal interests. 
Sarkozy has been criticized on his decision to intervene in Libya because aside from the 
official justification that was to "leave the Libyan people choose its own destiny” (Libération, 
2011), former president Sarkozy used this intervention to serve his personal interests that are 
described as a combination between a wish to restore his presidential image as well as 
Sarkozy’s desire to see his prestige project, a Mediterranean union further developed 
(Bagehot, 2011). 
           In 2011, Nicolas Sarkozy was at his lowest in the polls for the 2012 presidential 
elections. Indeed, on March 3
rd
 2011, only a few days before the adoption of the UN 
resolution 1973, only 21% of the French intended to vote for Sarkozy at the first round of the 
2012 presidential elections (Le Parisien, 2012). Since the beginning of his five-year mandate, 
and especially during the two first years, Nicolas Sarkozy made mistakes that deteriorated his 
reputation and popularity. As a response to these mistakes, Sarkozy said that it took him "a 
few months" to "make president." "It took me some time to find the balance between 
proximity and solemnity," he said (Le Monde, 2012). Therefore, Sarkozy staked everything 
on the last year of his mandate to reestablish his presidential image and in this way win the 
2012 presidential elections. By making the choice of intervening in Libya, Sarkozy attempted 
to please the 70% of French people who supported the intervention in Libya (Political 
Overview 2011, p.29). 
           The relationship between France and the Mediterranean has been such a major 
diplomatic and personal concern for Nicolas Sarkozy that we can legitimately speak of 
“Sarkozy's Mediterranean policy” (Henry 2012, p.405). On February 7th 2007, in Toulon, 
during his presidential campaign, Nicolas Sarkozy presented his Mediterranean Union project. 
He stated that it would become the major purpose of the French foreign policy for his five 
years mandate. The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was launched on the 13th July 2008 
at the Paris Summit. The UfM’s aim was to constitute a framework for political, economic 
and social relations between the European Union and the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean 
countries (History, Union for the Mediterranean). Therefore, Libya has been invited to 
participate to the UfM. However, the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was the only leader 
who rejected Paris' invitation to attend the UfM's first session in 2008. According to Gaddafi, 
the UfM takes economic projects that have already failed in the earlier attempt to create a 
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union for Mediterranean, the "Barcelona Process", launched in 1995 by the EU and the 
Mediterranean countries. Gaddafi was not satisfied by this Union for the Mediterranean and 
responded that Libya did not belong to the European Union but to the Arab League, and that 
Libya would not deign to accept this offer. Moreover, he has accused the EU of wanting to 
dominate the North African countries, once under European colonial rule (EU Observer, 
2008). Nicolas Sarkozy’s dear project was therefore halted largely because of Gaddafi. Thus, 
Nicolas Sarkozy had clear interest in getting rid of Gaddafi of the circle of the leaders 
concerned by his project. 
 
3.2 France’s interest for the Libyan “Black Gold” 
            
By analyzing a phenomenon from the state level analysis, we find the explanation in 
characteristics of the state: the type of government, the type of economic system, interest 
groups and national interests (Mingst 2010, p.68). On an official website of the French 
government, it is written that “France intends to retain the ability to act alone if its national 
interests and bilateral commitments require it to do so” (Vie Publique, 2011). By this 
statement, we understand that France does not hesitate to intervene in a country if its national 
interests are at stake and according to realism, states are driven by their national interests. 
Thus from a realist point of view France intervened in Libya because of national interests. But 
what are these interests that were at stake due to the Libyan civil war? France is far from 
being self-sufficient in oil. In 2010, only 1% of needs were met by the France’s production, 
according to statistics from the French Union of Petroleum Industries (Hamza, 2012)
 
. This 
need to import energy creates a great interdependence which makes France willing to utilise 
all necessary means to secure these interests. 
According to the French National Institute for Statistics and Economics Studies 
(INSEE), the French branch of Eurostat, the oil consumed in France is imported from four 
large regions: Africa, ex-USSR, the Middle East, and the North Sea (Insee, 2012). As we have 
seen, the import of oil is crucial for the French economy and thereby, their security. The 
region that has seen its oil exports to France increased the most since the last thirty years is 
Africa. In fact, the share of oil consumed in France imported from Africa accounted for 
16.3% in 1979, whereas it represented 32.1% in 2010. In 2010, half of the oil imported from 
Africa was actually extracted in Libya. The rate of Libyan oil importation increased steadily 
from 2003 to 2010, evolving from 4.2% in 2003 to 15.9% in 2010 which made Libya  a major 
oil supplier and thereby a key actor for French security. Before the Revolution, France was 
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Libya’s second client for oil. Economic relations between Libya and France were essentially 
based on the import of Libyan oil to France. Indeed, French imports from Libya were 
composed more than 99% of hydrocarbons (France diplomatie, 2012).  
    However, the import of Libyan oil in France fell by 68.9% between 2010 and 2011: 
the Libyan oil accounted for only 4.9% of imports in 2011. According to INSEE, this is a 
result of the Libyan conflict and has led France to change its map of oil suppliers. Libyan 
exports were offset by contributions from Algeria, Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Ghana and 
Kazakhstan (INSEE, 2012). Nevertheless, these “substitute” countries do not replace the 
precious and promising oil importer that Libya was. In February 2001, given the continuing 
deterioration of the situation in Libya, the French oil group Total started to suspend its oil 
production on some of its facilities. "We started to suspend some of our production capacity" 
in Libya, told a spokesman for the group (La Tribune, 2011)
 
. This created problems to the 
French supply of oil which in turn threatened France’s economy. 
           According to realism, oil is a strategic goods that is fundamental for states’ survival 
which is their primary goal. From a realist point of view, states desire stability in the 
availability of supplier countries and commodities (Mingst 2010, p.123). Thus, the revolution 
in Libya, which, as we have seen, has destabilized the oil market in Libya, could be seen as a 
risk to the security of the French state. As a result, France engaged in a military intervention 
in Libya to try to restore order in Libya as soon as possible, and thereby revive the oil industry 
in Libya.  
A rumor released by the French daily Libération on September 1
st
, 2011 indicates that 
a secret agreement on oil was passed between France and the new Libyan authorities, the 
National Transitional Council. Libération was based on a letter, dated from April 3
rd
 2011, 17 
days after the adoption of the UN resolution 1973, in which it was stipulated that “with regard 
to the oil agreement passed with France in exchange for the recognition of our Council, we 
have delegated brother Mahmoud at the London summit as the legitimate representative of 
Libya to sign this agreement assigning 35% of total crude oil to the French in exchange of full 
and ongoing support to our Council" (Libération 2011). This letter was addressed to the office 
of the Emir of Qatar because this country is from the beginning of the uprising the 
intermediate between France and the NTC.  
Even though the authenticity of this letter has not been verified and has been denied by 
the French government and the NTC, the NTC did not hide that the priority for reconstruction 
and the allocation of oil contracts would be given to countries that have supported the revolt. 
Given the high costs of the Libya intervention (The Ministry of Defence refers to 1 million 
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Euros per day), the French Foreign Minister, Alain Juppé reassured the French people by 
stating that “the intervention of France in Libya is an investment for the future" (Le Point, 
2011). Therefore, by this statement, Juppé declares that there are economic interests in Libya 
and that these interests will be met through the intervention in Libya. It can therefore be 
assumed that agreements on oil had already been signed before the start of the intervention in 
Libya, which motivated France to intervene in Libya in order to satisfy these economic 
interests, which, as we have seen, are almost entirely related to oil.  
 
4. A constructivist analysis of Germany’s refusal of the Libya intervention 
 
4.1 A troubled History and civilian power 
 
     There are some major differences between France and Germany in their history and 
identity that plays an important part in how they behave on the international stage. France has 
a long and unbroken history of being a major power and Germany has risen from the ashes of 
World War II (Lehne, 2012). After the War Germany was divided and had a completely 
changed perception of itself. From having had imperial aspirations, it was now a country 
seeking multilateral solutions to global problems, who created a policy of avoiding power 
politics and the use of military force (Lehne, 2012). Germany had become a nation, that 
according to Maull, was “built on cooperation instead of competition, on the pursuit of wealth 
rather than power, on a quest for integration through transfer of sovereignty instead of a vain 
search for autonomy, dominance and status”, something he defines as a civilian power 
(Maull, 2004, p. 3). This was partly a result of the WWII victors’ desire to keep Germany 
pacified but also because of the new, strong culture of ‘never again’ among the German elites 
and population. The meaning of the ‘never again’ policy was that Germany would not engage 
in any aggressive wars and instead build a nation as a ´civilian power´, which would use 
civilised methods such as the rule of international law and willingness to sacrifices 
sovereignty to supranational organisations (Maull, 2004, p. 4).  
This view of Germany´s role on the international stage kept its dominating influence 
until after the unification. As Germany grew bigger and stronger, other nations started to 
expect more and there were talks about Germany playing a bigger role in the international 
community. After a few years, the pressure from its allies started to build. Especially the US 
was pushing for a sharing of the burden and led an active attempt to make Germany 
contribute more as part of military and peacemaking operations (Wittlinger, 2010, p. 118). It 
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still was very hard for the Germans to perceive themselves as a military power, which has 
been proved through their reticence every time military measures have been brought up as 
means to solve international problems. (Maull, 2004, p 9). 
The mounting pressure eventually pushed Germany into a rapid development of the 
policies from the former Bonn republic, which resented the use of force. As there were talks 
about Germany taking on greater responsibility in the international community again, the 
questions about using military force in multilateral operations started to intensify. In 1993 the 
UN secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali said that the international community would not have 
any objections if Germany participated militarily in multilateral operations. This view though, 
was not shared among the majority of the German public who did not want to see their troops 
deployed around the world and Germany kept a quite neutral policy which fitted with their 
identity as a civilian power (Wittlinger, 2010, p. 118).  
This policy of restraint continued thus after the unification but combined, the pressure 
from its allies and the national discourse were starting to change Germany. This had the effect 
that Germany reluctantly began to ‘normalizing its policies. From being held back by the 
division and their history, it was to some degree, beginning to act more as a ´normal´ western 
power. Germany was starting to fulfill the expectations of its allies, while at the same time 
trying to stay out of power politics (Bickerton, 2011, p. 39). The first major changes came 
along with a change of government, when the Red and Green coalition came into power 1998. 
They were able to legitimately distance themselves from Nazi-Germany which gave them a 
bigger freedom to maneuver. They used two different approaches to build the new German 
identity: they focused on their big historical responsibilities from the horrors of the Second 
World War, while at the same time started to see Germany and German identity as something 
positive (Wittlinger, 2010, p. 44). 
This gave Germany a new issue to deal with as their dedication to multilateral 
cooperation was now going to make it difficult to maintain the antimilitarism that had 
dominated since the Second World War. The military participation in the Balkans was a sign 
that Germany was ready to use some military force even if it did not perceive itself as a 
´normal´ power (Wittlinger, 2010, p. 121). The lengthy discussions before Germany agreed to 
deploy troops in the Operation Allied Force against Serbia 1999, showed that it still was not 
easy for Germany to see itself use military force as a tool even when there was a genocide 
taking place in Europe (Miskimmon, 2012, p. 394). The result of these discussions was 
nonetheless very important, as Germany took its first big steps by deploying troops in a major 
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conflict and as Wittlinger writes, Germany was starting to evolve “from a security consumer 
to a security exporter even if this involved military means” (Wittlinger, 2010, p. 121).  
Even though Germany was starting to use force as a political tool, it was still very 
clear on only deploying force when it was the last solution and for defensive or humanitarian 
reasons as well. Germany was also very careful so that their actions would not be seen as a 
return to power politics. It insisted on acting through multilateral cooperation and on using 
military measures only in cases regarding international peace and protecting human rights 
(Maull, 2004, p. 8). These premisses made it clear that Germany might not take part in all of 
their allies’ international operations, which could be seen both as a continuation of their 
civilian power policy but also as a break with their aspirations to be a part of the international 
community and a dependable partner (Miskimmon, 2012, p. 401). 
 
4.2 Rising confidence and new assertiveness 
 
The mission in the Balkans made it clear that ethical reasons were very important for 
Germany to use military force. It was also a way for the Germans to show that they were now 
a reliable international partner who was ready to participate even when it involved the use of 
force (Wittlinger, 2010, p. 127). This, combined with Germany’s expanding role in the EU, 
gave it a growing confidence and a rising sense of importance and an awareness of its 
political weight (Lehne, 2012)(Miskimmon, 2012, p. 394). After the 9/11 terror attacks, 
Germany showed great support for the US and their efforts in Afghanistan, that they also 
supported militarily. The support for the US policy was not an axiom though, as it appeared 
when president Bush started talking about an axis of evil, pre-emptive strikes and an invasion 
of Iraq. At that point, Germany´s limitations were met and they refused to have any part of the 
invasion and even voted against a UN resolution on the matter (Wittlinger, 2010, p. 132).  
The chancellor at the time, Gerhard Schröder, took a very clear on stance against the 
war in Iraq and was determined on a German policy that was not build on war but was based 
on peace and democracy instead, something he saw as contrasting the American policy. He 
emphasised that German policy were made in Berlin and nowhere else and made it clear he 
did not support the US views and disagreed on some dimensions of the war on terror 
(Wittlinger, 2010, p. 129). This demonstrated two things: that Germany still was not ready to 
deploy military force if was not the last resort and also that Germany had a changed 
perception of itself and the obligations it had to fulfill in their multinational partnerships, 
since it no longer felt obliged to follow its allies on important international issues. This forced 
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the US to see Germany more as an equal whose support could no longer be taken for granted 
and Germany made it clear that it would not follow a US policy if it did not conform with the 
German approach (Wittlinger, 2010, p. 131). 
As Germany started to build their own sovereign identity, it begged the question of 
which international operations Germany should participate in and how they would contribute 
to them. The discussions in Germany remained in part on how it was supposed to deal with its 
history. Should it share a larger part of the burden of multilateral military missions or should 
their historical actions compel them to advocate a more non-military and pacifist approach to 
international issues (Miskimmon, 2012, p. 394)? With Merkel coming into power in 2005, the 
new regime was quick to underline that the German policies would remain in the same mold 
as before: Germany would remain an actor who follows international law and defends human 
rights, while gradually taking a more active role on the global stage (Wittlinger, 2010, p. 132). 
Merkel soon criticised the US over Guantanamo, Russia for breaking human rights and China 
over Tibet, thereby underlining that Germany had an independent policy and would not shy 
away from taking their own path (Wittlinger, 2010, p. 134-135).  
Germany´s quest to get a permanent place on the UN security council (at least until the 
EU gets one) is a good expression of how Germany is now identifying itself as an important 
actor on the global stage but as their attempt to give the EU a place on the UNSC as well, also 
proves that Germany puts a big value on the multilateral cooperation between states 
(Wittlinger, 2010, p. 135). Its preference for multilateral cooperation along with its 
independent identity, create some challenges for the German security policy concerning when 
to follow their allies or not, since they also stands for anti-militarism. This becomes 
increasingly difficult as Germany does not have a coherent national security policy which 
makes every new situation something that must be discussed in debt in the Bundestag before 
Germany can act (Maull, 2004, p. 18)(Lehne, 2012). 
As the case of Libya shows, Germany was not ready to lead an offensive mission in 
another country as long as there were factors they saw as big uncertainties. Foreign minister 
Westerwelle described the situation as “unpredictable” and when asked about Germany´s 
stand, he said “Your own instinct is to say 'We have to do something.' But military 
intervention is to take part in a civil war that could go on for a long time”. He then went on to 
say that "Germany has a strong friendship with our European partners. But we won't take 
part in any military operation and I will not send German troops to Libya." Instead Germany 
would focus on targeted sanctions and political pressure which he explained with 
"Considering alternatives to military engagement is not the same as doing nothing" (Harding, 
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2011) something that from a constructivist perspective can be seen as Germany holding on to 
its identity of anti-militarism even when their allies do not agree, as Westerwelle was 
expressing these views at the same time that most of Germany’s closest allies were pushing 
for a UN resolution to intervene in the conflict. 
These points put together show that the German identity of anti-militarism and 
multilateralism is still a dominant force in Germany, but also that they are willing to break 
some of their preferences for civilian means, if a situation arises in which the only solution is 
a military one. This shows from a constructivist point of view that the German identity of 
multilateral cooperation is valued but that the culture of restraint is strong and that Germany 
still has difficulties with deploying troops unless it is done as a last resort and purely for 
humanitarian reasons. This goes well with Germany´s preference, since the Second World 
War, which is to use diplomatic and economical means instead of force to wield their 
influence. In Germany, there is a strong opinion that military force is normatively worse than 
any other form of power and that it should be avoided as far as possible. Maull argues that 
Germany is a security-policy ´paradox´ because they have continued the policies from the 
time before the unification and has not tried to pursue power in the ´normal´ way, which he 
explains as the underlying identity of the Germans (Karp, 2009, p. 17). 
 
5. A realist analysis of Germany’s refusal of the Libya intervention 
 
5.1 Germany´s way to secure power 
 
    Even if you assume that Germany has an identity where they prefer to use civilian 
power, it does not prove that they do not use their civilian strength to influence others and 
impose their way even without the use of military force. It is only if you presume that the use 
of civilian power to achieve influence is normatively more benign than the use of military 
force, that a so called civilian power is something that cannot be analysed from a realist 
perspective (Karp 2009, p. 17). This civilian power could be seen as Germany making use of 
their size and powerful economy to influence other nations, as it is seen in the EU (Karp, 
2009, 14) and they can thereby be perceived as a state in a realist sense, with self-interest as 
the driving factor (Miskimmon, 2012, p. 394). The difference between Germany and France is 
that Germany prefer not to use military force unless it is utterly necessary and instead utilises 
other means to reach their goals. As Karp puts it “a civilian power is not a military power but 
20 
 
it can, and usually does, pursue long-term strategic economic interest with clearly 
instrumental strategies” (Karp, 2009, p. 17). 
As Germany has been militarily involved in several conflicts it is now questionable if 
Germany is a civilian power any more. If you take the participation in the interventions 
against Serbia and Afghanistan versus the nonparticipation in Libya, you can see some 
differences that explain why they chose to act as they did. The war in former Yugoslavia and 
the genocide by Serbia was taking place in Europe and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 were 
partially planned in Germany (BBC News, 2005). Therefore both of these interventions can 
be seen as ways for Germany to neutralise threats against their security and to prove their 
credentials as an international actor to cement their place in the international community 
(Wittlinger, 2010 , p.126-127) while the Libyan situation was not perceived as a threat and 
thus was not an intervention deemed necessary. 
 
5.2 A Cost/Benefit analysis and room for maneuver 
 
To analyse Germany from a realist perspective, you obviously have to consider 
security reasons but if you also count in economical factors the explanatory “power” is rising 
significantly. In the case of Libya, there are several factors that made Germany abstain from 
voting and participating in the intervention. As foreign minister Westerwelle put it when he 
explained the German decision:“We calculated the risk” and “it is also clear that we cannot 
threaten military action against every country in north Africa where there is injustice” 
(Miskimmon, 2012, p. 397). When you think of this against a backdrop where Germany had 
participated in some recent military operations, it could be seen as if Germany did not have 
any interest in participating in Libya, since it was not in their national interest and therefore 
made a decision based on their relative gains. 
Maybe more important than anything else when you study Germany´s decision not to 
join in the intervention, is to make a cost/benefit analysis of Germany´s losses and gains from 
participating. Apart from normative factors, there are several other indications on why 
Germany would not be interested in getting involved in the conflict. First of all there was the 
possibility of being tied down in a lengthy and costly conflict, something Germany would 
prefer to avoid, as they were deeply occupied with the euro-zone crisis and thereby already 
under some economic pressure (Miskimmon, 2012, p. 402). Moreover, Germany was, 
according to Miskimmon, not satisfied with the planning of the mission and thought of the 
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intervention plan as rash, which did not help to ease their fears of a long and economically 
demanding involvement (Miskimmon, 2012, p. 397).  
If you take a look at Libya´s importance to German economy, it is clear that Libya was 
not a crucial trading partner and that Germany did not stand to lose a lot if they did not 
participate in the intervention (Miskimmon, 2012, p. 402). Germany was not dependant of 
Libyan crude oil, who exported about 14 percent of their oil to Germany and thereby did not 
represent any security threat (Miskimmon, 2012, p. 402). Instead, Germany’s most important 
trading partner in energy was Russia, where a large part of their energy imports originated 
from (U.S. Energy Information Administration). This makes German relations with Russia 
very important and even though a realist approach might suggest that countries such as 
Germany would be bandwagoning to the powerful US, the relations with such a crucial 
energy supplier should not be underestimated. So although Germany appreciate their strong 
ties with the US, they do not mind occasionally being on the same side as Russia, who they 
also perceive as an integral part of their security (Karp, 2009, p. 28).  
This could explain why Germany did not find it important or critical enough to 
participate in the intervention in Libya, even though it could hurt their long term collaboration 
with their closest allies. By choosing not to participate, it could also be argued that Germany 
is trying not to be tied down by multilateral commitment and to keep their options open, as 
they balance the relations with its allies in the west and Russia to the east (Miskimmon, 2012, 
p. 402). Germany did not see the Libya crisis as an acute risk and did not perceive it as a 
particular threat to their security. This might have tipped the weight to focus on economic 
factors and the relations with Russia in a quest for relative gains (Lehne, 2012). 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
By using constructivism in order to explain the reasons why France intervened in 
Libya, we found the explanation in the French identity. The two aspects of the French identity 
that we have used to explain France’s participation in the intervention in Libya are: its wish to 
promote Human Rights around the world and its deep tradition of intervener in Africa. As we 
have seen, France is proud of being the “homeland of Human Rights”, a heritage that dates 
back to the French Revolution. When Gaddafi’s son promised that “rivers of blood will run 
through Libya” if the protesters didn’t accept the reform offers, the international community 
mobilized itself. In the name of Human Rights, France saw itself obliged to fulfill its historic 
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role, and thus to protect the Libyans from Gaddafi’s crimes. France launched the Libya 
intervention because it wants to maintain its tradition of Human Rights promoter. France 
wants to keep its reputation of “homeland of Human Rights” in order to stay important and 
influent. As we have seen, France looks after the promotion of Human Rights around the 
world, but is particularly attentive for the African continent and does not hesitate to intervene 
in Africa. France’s old and strong links with Africa, which constitute a part of the French 
identity, have played a role in France’s participation in the Libya intervention as well. These 
cultural, military and economic relations make France to think it has a great influence in 
Africa. As we have seen, France perceives itself as a legitimate intervener when conflicts 
erupt in Africa. Thus, through the constructivist perspective, this dimension of the French 
identity also explains why France intervened in Libya. However, France did not intervene in 
every conflict around the world, not in all the African conflicts, where Human Rights were 
violated. Constructivism cannot explain why France did not intervene in all the other 
conflicts. We know that the decision of intervening in military interventions is not made 
randomly. Thus, there must be other reasons for France to intervene in Libya, but 
constructivism is not able to grasp them. 
By applying the realist theory to the case of the French participation to the Libya 
intervention, we had to think in terms of interests. We have used two level of analysis: the 
individual and the state level. Analyzing which of Sarkozy’s personal interests could be 
achieved by making France intervene in Libya was interesting because Sarkozy had a leader 
role in the Libya intervention. Indeed, he was the one who convinced President Obama who 
was hesitating about intervening or not, and he also persuaded China and Russia not to block 
the negotiations by their veto. From a realist point of view, Sarkozy decided to intervene in 
Libya to try to restore his presidential image and to revive his project, the Union for the 
Mediterranean, which was partially blocked because of Gaddafi. From the state level analysis 
and from a realist point of view, France intervened in Libya in order to restore the stability 
which put at stake its Libyan oil imports. Thus, France had to intervene in Libya as soon as 
possible in order to protect its own security. Realism gives arguments that constructivism 
cannot grasp. Realism clearly shows that France had interests in Libya, especially oil. Indeed, 
oil is a very important resource for France’s security, and as we have seen, the Libyan oil 
represents an important share of the French imports of oil. Thus, France had an urgent need to 
restore stability in Libya. In the case of the intervention in Libya, France used its identity of 
intervener as its official arguments for the intervention. Indeed, the official justification of this 
intervention was the protection of the Libyans. However it is clear that France had major 
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national interests in Libya, and these interests are quite obvious. Neither constructivism nor 
realism can grasp all the reasons why France intervened in Libya. These two theories 
complement each other in this case. 
By using constructivist theory, it becomes very clear that France and Germany has 
completely different perceptions of themselves and two almost opposite identities when it 
comes to security policy and the use of military means. We think that constructivist theory has 
a strong explanatory power when it comes to Germany’s resistance to utilise military force as 
a political tool. They have only used military means on few occasions and only intervened in 
conflicts when they perceived themselves as having a just cause. This reluctance of using 
military means to further ensure their security is hard to explain for realist. Even though 
Miskimmon tries to make a case for the prioritisation of economic factors, its difficult from a 
realist point of view, when Germany goes against a state as powerful as the US when they 
might would have expected a policy of bandwagoning. 
By using constructivism, it becomes very clear that France and Germany have 
completely different perceptions of themselves and two almost opposite identities when it 
comes to security policy and the use of military means. We think that constructivist theory has 
a strong explanatory power when it comes to Germany’s resistance to utilise military force as 
a political tool. They have only used military means on few occasions and only intervened in 
conflicts when they perceived themselves as having a just cause. This reluctance of using 
military means to further ensure their security is hard to explain for realist. Even though 
Miskimmon tries to make a case for the prioritisation of economic factors, it is difficult from a 
realist point of view, to explain why Germany goes against a state as powerful as the US 
when they might have been expected a policy of bandwagoning. 
The German preference for multilateralism and willingness to participate in 
supranational cooperation is also somewhere that constructivism has an advantage over 
realism, which with its focus on the sovereign nation state can find that difficult to explain. 
The perception of Germany as having a culture of restraint when it comes to using military 
measures and an insistence on multilateral coalitions is more easily explained by the German 
identity and influence from their history than of pure German national interest. The German 
identity as a civilian power is deeply rooted in the population as well as strong anti-militaristic 
sentiments. Though, as we have seen in our analysis, it is also combined with a sense of 
responsibility towards protecting universal humans rights, something that has led to some 
difficult decisions for the Germans after which they have participated in some militarily 
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operations. Their choice not join the intervention in Libya can therefore be seen as a bit of a 
paradox when you consider the rate at which Gaddafi was killing civilians.  
     This is where realism might have an advantage on constructivism: Germany’s view of 
itself as having a historical responsibility to protect human rights arguably should have 
persuaded them to join in the intervention. We think that the realist explanation of how an 
economically pressed Germany, who thought it more important to save the euro-zone and 
their own economy than getting committed in a costly engagement, decided not to participate 
in a Libyan intervention. It could be seen as a continuation of the German anti militarism, but 
that would create problems with how to explain their earlier interventions in Serbia and 
Afghanistan. The problem with this advantage in explanatory power is that it is not as durable 
if you, as mentioned above, take into account the strong resistance of using force if it is not as 
a last resort, something the Germans expressed concern about in the build up to the 
intervention. If Germany had not taken such a public stance against the operation they might 
have been able to avoid spending substantial resources while at the same time keeping their 
partners in the NATO satisfied. When Germany insisted on abstaining on the vote, they 
arguably did so because of their normative believe in civilian solutions and thereby giving 
preference to the constructivist theory. 
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